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Identifying Sorting: In Theory
*
 
We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether Assortative 
Matching between worker and firm types is positive or negative. In standard competitive 
matching models the wages are determined by the marginal contribution of a worker, and the 
marginal contribution might be higher or lower for low productivity firms depending on the 
production function. For every production function that induces positive sorting we can find a 
production function that induces negative sorting but generates identical wages. This arises 
even when we allow for non-competitive mismatch, for example due to search frictions. Even 
though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting, we can identify the strength, i.e., the 
magnitude of the cross-partial, and the associated welfare loss. While we show analytically 
that standard fixed effects regressions are not suitable to recover the strength of sorting, we 
propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of 
search frictions independent of the sign of the sorting. 
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Sorting of workers to jobs matters for the eﬃcient production of output in the economy. If there
are strong complementarities or substitutes between workers and jobs, the exact allocation has large
eﬃciency implications. In contrast, when complementarities are nearly absent, not much output is lost
from the random allocation of workers to jobs. This is important for policy, for example whether we
want to design an unemployment insurance program that provides incentives for workers to look for the
“right” job instead of accepting the ﬁrst oﬀer (see for example Acemoglu and Shimer 1999). There are
also profound implications for redistribution policies. In the presence of strong sorting, redistribution
through mismatching leads to substantial distortions whereas the distortions are minimal when sorting
is weak. And subsidies to education will in the presence of strong sorting lead to increased competition
between workers, thus transferring some of the subsidy rents from workers to ﬁrms.
Given the importance of sorting, a large body of recent empirical literature has estimated whether
sorting is positive or negative. In part, this renewed interest has been catalyzed by the availability
of worker-ﬁrm match data. Several empirical papers (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Abowd,
Kramarz, Lengermann, and Perez-Duarte (2004)) ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant or even negative correlation in
ﬁxed eﬀects between worker and ﬁrm types. This result has been replicated for a number of countries
such as France, US, Denmark and Brazil. The result is taken as indication that Positive Assortative
Matching between workers and ﬁrms does not play a role in the labor market.
On the other hand, recent work reveals that a structural labor search model that has strong com-
plementarities and thus induces Positive Assortative Matching in equilibrium can nevertheless generate
smaller and even negative correlations in the ﬁxed eﬀects of workers and ﬁrms (Gautier and Teulings
(2006), Lise, Meghir and Robin (2008), Lopes de Melo (2008) and Lentz (2008)). In some cases this
is attributed to the non-linear structure of the wage setting that is not picked up in the regression
speciﬁcation. Other work by Gabaix and Landier (2008) argues that sorting of CEOs has become more
important as is reﬂected in the increased wages.
In this paper we address the issue of identiﬁcation of sorting in a simple theoretical framework and
obtain the following results. First, in the frictionless matching model (Becker 1973), we show that
identifying whether sorting is positive or negative is impossible using wage data alone. To see this, note
that in this model more productive workers always earn higher wages and more productive ﬁrms always
make more proﬁts. Under Positive Assortative Matching (PAM), the more productive ﬁrm also has
the highest marginal product from labor, i.e. the cross-partial is positive. This implies that high type
ﬁrms hire high type workers and they pay high wages. Under Negative Assortative Matching (NAM)
instead, low productive ﬁrms have a comparative advantage from hiring more productive workers, i.e.
2the cross-partial is negative.1 As a result, high type ﬁrms pay lower wages. By ranking ﬁrms according
to the wages they pay, we do not identify the most productive ﬁrm. Without any additional data on
the proﬁtability of each job, it is impossible to identify whether sorting is positive or negative. This is
true even if we consider wages oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Second, we explicitly allow for mismatch to occur in equilibrium due to search frictions. We ﬁnd
that the ﬁrst-order eﬀect is that wages of a given worker have an inverse U-shape around the optimal
allocation, the “bliss point”. Under mismatch with a relatively bad ﬁrm, wages increase as the ﬁrm
type increases because the ﬁrm moves closer to the bliss-point, whereas wages decrease once the worker
is mismatched with too good a ﬁrm because better ﬁrms move further from the bliss-point. Higher
productivity ﬁrms have to be compensated for their willingness to match with a “bad” worker because it
destroys their opportunity to match with a “good” worker. This leads to the bliss-point in the pattern
of compensation if a worker meets the “right” ﬁrm, rather then a wage schedule that is increasing
everywhere in the type of ﬁrm. The net eﬀect on a given worker’s wages from increasing the ﬁrm
type is therefore ambiguous and second-order. For the simplest, type-independent cost of delay, we
explicitly show that the net eﬀect is exactly equal to zero under some common speciﬁcation. This
version, also studied in Atakan (2006), is a close reformulation of Becker (1973). When search costs
are type-dependent (as in Shimer and Smith (2000) for example), the net eﬀect may still be either
positive or negative. The additional component induced through type-dependence is proportional to
the magnitude of the friction and, compared to the inverted U-shape, the net eﬀect of ﬁrm type on
wages is likely to be second-order and diﬃcult to isolate in the data.
Third, and in spite of the fact that we cannot identify the sign, we develop a method that in theory
allows for identiﬁcation of the strength of sorting. Ultimately, eﬃciency properties depend on how big
the complementarities/substitutes are. Identiﬁcation derives from the distinct features of the range
of wages a worker receives who has been observed repeatedly. First, the highest wage corresponds to
her bliss-point. We use this to order the workers and obtain the type distribution. Likewise, we can
obtain an order of the ﬁrms by the level of wages that they pay (this identiﬁes those ﬁrms with the
highest willingness to hire better workers - which is positively related to type under positive sorting
and negatively under negative sorting). Second, the diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest wage
is equivalent to the cost of search. Third, we calculate the loss due to mismatch over the range of
wages, which from the theory can be expressed in terms of the absolute value of the cross-partial of
the production function. Given that we know the cost of search, we can now obtain the strength of the
cross-partial, or equivalently, the strength of sorting.
1We use the term comparative advantage to denote a larger absolute gain in output from matching with a better
worker, rather than the stronger concept of a larger percentage gain as used e.g. in Sattinger (1975).
3Before proceeding to the model, we brieﬂy lay out the empirical issue. Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis (1999) use a simple empirical measure of sorting that can be obtained by estimating a log-wage
equation in which wages are a function of a worker ﬁxed eﬀect, a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, and an orthogonal
error term
logwit = aitβ + δi + ψj(i,t) + εit (1)
where wit denotes the wage, ait are time varying observables of workers, δi is a worker ﬁxed eﬀect, ψj is
the ﬁxed eﬀect of the ﬁrm j at which worker i is employed at time t, and εit is an orthogonal residual.
That is, ψj captures the average eﬀect that a ﬁrm has on the wages of the workers that are willing
to match with it. The correlation between αi and ψj in a given match is taken as an estimate of the
degree of sorting. Abowd et al (2004) propose a bargaining procedure in which higher ﬁrms pay higher
wages in line with (1) as a test of Becker’s (1973) idea of matching.
We argue here that such a pay schedule is inconsistent with Becker’s theory because every worker
would like to match with the best ﬁrm. Becker’s theory is inseparably linked to a theory of wages
which prevents such overcrowding of workers at top ﬁrms. We point out the distinctive features of the
underlying theory of wages, and extend them to a simple and tractable model with search frictions. We
show in our theoretical exercise that the assumption that the ﬁrm eﬀect is independent of the worker’s
type is theoretically not justiﬁed in this setting. In particular, for those workers who are matched with
a ﬁrm that has a lower rank than their own, the wage increases when the ﬁrm type increases because
the worker-ﬁrm “ﬁt” improves. In contrast, workers who are matched with a lower ranked ﬁrm see a
decrease in the wage when the ﬁrm becomes better because the worker-ﬁrm “ﬁt” deteriorates.
A similar logic holds in the context of matching with frictions. With wage bargaining in a model
with search frictions, the set of eligible partners is bounded by those matches where the match surplus
is zero relative to continue searching. For all acceptable partners the surplus is positive. For a given
worker type, the surplus goes to zero for a match both with too bad a ﬁrm and too good a ﬁrm. Any
bargaining procedure that pays wages that are monotonic in the surplus will therefore result in wages
being non-monotonic in ﬁrm type.
The goal of our analysis is to lay out this logic in the simplest possible environment. First, we
consider the frictionless benchmark, and then we extend it in a straight-forward way to a model with
frictions that allows worker and ﬁrm mismatch. Frictions are modeled in a two-stage set up: a stage of
random matching is followed by a frictionless matching stage. The beneﬁt of our modeling approach is
that the main eﬀects that drive the wage determination become clearly visible and highlights the forces,
limitations, and possibilities that arise in estimations that are based solely on wage data. As such, it
informs our understanding of the results obtained in more complicated inﬁnite horizon steady-state
models that preclude closed-form theoretical analysis but are often used for structural estimation.
42 The Frictionless Model
In order to make our point we start with the following very simple matching model following Becker
(1973). There is a unit mass of worker and a unit mass of ﬁrms. Workers and ﬁrms are heterogeneous
in terms of their productivity. Workers draw their type x from distribution Γ(x) with smooth density
γ(x) on [0,1]. Firms draw their type y from distribution Υ(y) with smooth density υ(y) on [0,1].
When types x and y form a match, they produce positive output f(x,y) > 0 whilst having an
outside option of remaining unmatched. We assume that workers and ﬁrms can be ranked in terms
of their productivity, i.e. fx > 0 and fy > 0. Then it is without loss of generality to index a worker
by his rank in terms of productivity, i.e. by the fraction of workers that are less productive then him.
Similarly, we can identify each ﬁrm by its rank in the distribution of ﬁrm productivities. This means
that Γ(.) = Υ(.) = x, i.e. the distributions are uniform.2 Assume that workers who do not get matched
obtain a payoﬀ of zero, and since output is non-negative, all agents will prefer to match. If output
of all matches is strictly positive, there will be a continuum of wage schedules that can support the
same allocation, and we will assume that an exogenous bargaining procedure determines which split of
surplus is implemented. We will denote this payoﬀ by the constant w0 ≥ 0 that pins down the wage of
the lowest worker type.
For the assignment of workers to ﬁrms the cross-partial of the production function is important.
We do not restrict the sign of the cross-partial since this will be instrumental in determining whether
there is positive or negative assortative matching. Denote by F be the class of all functions f that
are monotonic: fx,fy > 0; and that have a monotonic marginal product: fxy(x,y) is either always
positive or always negative.3 The assumption that the cross-partial does not change sign allows us to
unambiguously talk about positive or negative sorting. Production functions for which higher worker
types always have a comparative advantage at better ﬁrms (fxy > 0) are in set F+ ⊂ F. Production
functions for which higher worker types always have a comparative advantage at lower ﬁrms (fxy < 0)
are in set F− ⊂ F.
To illustrate the implications of our analysis we will derive our results for the following examples of
production functions
f+(x,y) = αxθyθ + h(x) + g(y), (2)
f−(x,y) = αxθ(1 − y)θ + h(x) + g(y), (3)
2The uniformity assumption is without loss of generality since the production function can be identiﬁed only up to a
normalization: For a general Γ(·) and Υ(·) and f(·,·) we can alternatively consider a uniform type space in which only
the ranking matters and an alternative production function ˜ f(x,y) = f(Γ(x),Υ(y)).
3Later, in section 5 we discuss the virtues of relaxing this assumption.
5where g(.) and h(.) are increasing functions and α ≥ 0 and θ > 0 are parameters that indicate the
strength of the complementarities. We assume that g(y) is such that higher ﬁrms produce higher
output even under the second speciﬁcation. It is obvious that f+ ∈ F+ and f− ∈ F−.
An assignment of workers x to ﬁrms y is denoted by µ, i.e., the partner y of worker x is µ(x).
In this part of the paper we assume a competitive matching market. A market equilibrium speciﬁes
an assignment between x’s and y’s and some wage schedule w(x,y) ≥ w0 that determines the split of
output between the worker and the ﬁrm. The payoﬀ to the worker is w(x,y) and the payoﬀ to the
ﬁrm is π(x,y) = f (x,y) − w(x,y) ≥ 0. Both workers and ﬁrms take the wage schedule as given. The
tuple of functions (µ,w) is an equilibrium if no worker wants to switch to a diﬀerent ﬁrm at the market
wages, i.e.
w(x,µ(x)) ≥ w(x,y) for all x and y;
and no ﬁrm wishes to employ a diﬀerent worker, i.e.
π(µ−1(y),y) ≥ π(x,y) for all x and y.4
We derive the main prediction of Becker’s (1973) model concerning the wages in the economy. In
equilibrium, each ﬁrm y maximizes proﬁts, taking the wage schedule as given:
max
x f(x,y) − w(x,y).









fx(˜ x,µ(˜ x))d˜ x + w0, (5)
where the constant of integration is pinned down by w0. Observe that the worker obtains exactly his
marginal product along the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, equilibrium proﬁts of type y are given




fy(µ−1(˜ y), ˜ y)d˜ y + f(0,0) − w0 (6)
Furthermore, we know from Becker’s analysis that matching is positive assortative when the production
function is supermodular (fxy > 0), in which case µ(x) = x. Under submodularity (fxy < 0) in
4It is well-known that a strict cross-partial yields a one-to-one mapping µ(·) in equilibrium. In general µ(·) is a
correspondence, with the equilibrium deﬁnition extended to all pairs in that correspondence.
6equilibrium the matching is negative assortative and µ(x) = 1 − x. With this in mind, we show that
in this simple competitive model the direction of sorting - i.e. the sign of the cross-partial - cannot
be identiﬁed from wage data. We ﬁrst show this result on the equilibrium path, then we show it oﬀ
the equilibrium path. In the next section we build an extended model with search frictions where the
wages oﬀ the equilibrium path actually arise.
2.1 On the equilibrium path
We will ﬁrst illustrate the result by considering our restricted class of production functions outlined
above and then present the general theorem. Suppose the underlying production technology is not
known and the true technology is either one of the two example technologies f+ given in (2) or f−










αθ˜ x2θ−1 + hx(˜ x)

d˜ x + w0 =
α
2
x2θ + h(x) − h(0) + w0.










αθ˜ x2θ−1 + hx(˜ x)

d˜ x + w0 =
α
2
x2θ + h(x) − h(0) + w0.
Under both functions the wages on the equilibrium path are exactly identical, and from wage data
alone one cannot distinguish between positive and negative sorting. The problem is obtaining the order
of the ﬁrms. If we only have wage data and no proﬁt data, and we derive the order on the ﬁrms by
ranking them by increasing wages, we will obtain two diﬀerent orders depending on whether we have
complements or substitutes. To see this, observe that under positive assortative matching (henceforth
PAM) higher type ﬁrms pay higher wages along the equilibrium path whereas under negative assortative
matching (NAM) higher type ﬁrms pay lower wages. In the former w(y,y) =
αy2θ
2 is increasing in y,
in the latter w(1 − y,y) =
α(1−y)2θ
2 is decreasing in y. This result is true for any general production
technology as summarized in the proposition that follows below.
Figure 1 has an example with the proﬁts, wages and total output when f+ = xy+y and f− = x(1−
y) + y. Observe that wages are identical in both cases (blue), but that proﬁts are decreasing in worker
type x under f+. While higher y ﬁrms have higher proﬁts, higher x workers are matched with lower y
ﬁrms who obtain lower proﬁts. In the example, with w0 = 0, we obtain w+(x,µ(x)) = x2
2 ,π+(x,µ(x)) =
x2
2 +x,f+(x,µ(x)) = x+x2 and w−(x,µ(x)) = x2
2 ,π−(x,µ(x)) = x2
2 +1−x,f+(x,µ(x)) = 1−x+x2.


















Figure 1: Equilibrium Wages w(x,µ(x)) [blue lines], Proﬁts π(x,µ(x)) [green lines], Total Output
f(x,µ(x)) [red lines] under f+ = xy + y [left] and f− = x(1 − y) + y [right] with w0 = 0.
Of course, under NAM π?,−(y) = y +
(1−y)2
2 is increasing in y even though π−(x,µ(x)) is decreasing in
x. Proﬁts will not be the same under both production functions.
Proposition 1 For any production function f ∈ F+ that induces positive sorting there exists a pro-
duction function f ∈ F− that induces negative sorting and the equilibrium wages w∗(x) are identical
under both production functions.
Proof. ¿From equation (5) we obtain the wage schedule. When generated by an underlying production





x (˜ x, ˜ x)d˜ x + w+
0 ,





x (˜ x,1 − ˜ x)d˜ x + w−
0 .
Observe that since w?,+(0) = w+
0 and w?,−(0) = w−
0 , both wage schedules are identical when the free
bargaining paramter satisﬁes w+
0 = w−
0 = w0 as we assumed. Then for w?,+(x) = w?,−(x) for all x, it is
suﬃcient that f+
x (˜ x, ˜ x) = f−
x (˜ x,1− ˜ x). For any f+(x,y) on [0,1]2 we can deﬁne f−(x,y) = f+(x,1−y)
on [0,1]2. The only restriction is that this function may not be increasing in y, so we may need to
“augment” the function to ensure that fy is positive. If fx,fy are bounded, it is suﬃcient to add a term
τ · y where τ > 0 is large enough to ensure fy > 0 everywhere. If fy is not bounded and negative, we
need to add a function g(y) that increases faster than the decrease of f+(x,1 − y) in y.
82.2 Oﬀ the equilibrium path
Identiﬁcation needs variation. Identiﬁcation of sorting from equilibrium wages may be diﬃcult simply
because there is no independent variation across ﬁrms and workers. In the frictionless case workers sort
perfectly in the sense that each type of ﬁrm attracts exactly one worker type. Even if workers became
unemployed and could match again later without frictions, the panel dimension would not allow us to
identify a separate eﬀect for ﬁrms and workers, because workers will always end up in the same type of
ﬁrm. There would not be any wage variation, and it cannot be identiﬁed whether a high wage is due
to the worker ability or the ﬁrm productivity.
Here we entertain the idea that worker “tremble” to oﬀ-the-equilibrium ﬁrms and obtain the associ-
ated oﬀ-equilibrium wages. If workers tremble, we would be able to see wage variation for workers and
ﬁrms of the same type. In the next section, we extend our environment to include search frictions such
that those deviations actually arise in equilibrium. Here we argue that oﬀ-equilibrium wages are still
not informative about the sorting in the market. Take the same example technologies f+ and f−. We
will show that any procedure that identiﬁes ﬁrm types y from wages alone in the f+ technology will
misidentify ﬁrm types in the technology f− as ˆ y = 1 − y. This is the case since observed wages under
this misinterpretation are exactly equal to the wages in the ﬁrst setting.
The wage schedule oﬀ equilibrium in the frictionless model is such that neither ﬁrms nor workers
would want to deviate to such matches. Oﬀ the equilibrium path this wage schedule is not uniquely
pinned down and wages range between the lowest wage that is just high enough to prevent ﬁrms from
deviating and the highest wage that is just high enough to prevent workers from deviating. While the
matched agents’ wages w(x,µ(x)) are determined as above, the wages of the mismatched agents w(x,y)
must satisfy:
f(x,y) − w(x,y) ≤ π(µ(x),y) (7)
w(x,y) ≤ w(x,µ(x)) (8)
where µ(x) = y in the case of PAM and µ(x) = 1−y in the case of NAM. For a given (x,y) combination,
call the set of wages that are consistent with (7) and (8) W(x,y). It is easily veriﬁed that in the case









In the case of f−(x,y) any wage w(x,y) in W(x,y) satisﬁes
αxθ(1 − y)θ −
α
2




which is identical to (9) if we misinterpret the types as ˆ y = 1−y. If we have no information on proﬁts,
as before we cannot derive the order on y simply from wage data. What is more, even after observing
9oﬀ-the-equilibrium path wages, the bounds on the wages under PAM and NAM are identical if we use
the order on wages to derive the order on y (in which case under NAM we assign the order 1−y to the
ﬁrms). The static Beckerian model will therefore not allow for identiﬁcation of assortative matching
based on wage data alone.
Proposition 2 For any production function f ∈ F+ that induces positive sorting there exists a pro-
duction function f ∈ F− that induces negative sorting and the equilibrium wage sets W(x,y) in the
former are identical to equilibrium wage set W(x,1 − y) in the latter.
Proof. The proof follows the same argument as in Proposition 1.
3 Mismatch due to Search Frictions
We now consider an extended model with mismatch due to frictions caused by delay. Unlike the static
Beckerian model, search frictions may induce diﬀerent behavior in the acceptance decision of matches.
First, assuming that the technology is generated by a supermodular production technology, we derive
the equilibrium allocation in the presence of a type-independent search cost. We address the issue
of identiﬁcation of positive/negative sorting in this model, and whether we can identify sorting from
wage data alone. Second, for this model we derive from the theory the ﬁrm-ﬁxed-eﬀect. The case of
type-independent search costs considerably simpliﬁes the analysis, but the gist of the argument carries
over for a more general search cost. Below in section 5 we consider a model with type-dependent search
cost.
3.1 Type-Independent Search Costs Under Supermodularity
Our model has hiring in two stages. In stage one, each worker is randomly paired with one ﬁrm. The
pairings are random. One can think of this part of the hiring process as standing in for some connections
that workers have to the labor market prior to engaging in an extensive search for labor. The pair can
either agree to stay together at some wage, or search for a better partner. Those who decide not to
stay together and those who did not get paired each incur a search cost c due to the delay. In the
second stage, all remaining agents are matched according to the competitive, frictionless allocation as
outlined above.5 After the search process has ended production starts. To allow for a panel dimension
5Here we need to worry about the possibility that when the acceptance sets span the entire type space (e.g. because of
high search costs or low complementarities), no agents are left in the second stage, in which case the continuation payoﬀ is
not determined. Without modeling this explicitly, we think of a tremble that ensures that there are always some agents
who end up in the next period. For many parameters each worker and ﬁrm type rejects some agents on the other side of
the market, and these agents will indeed move to the second stage.
10in the observations (i.e. each worker matched over time to more than one ﬁrm, and each ﬁrm matched
over time with more than one worker) we assume that each agent goes through this two-stages hiring
process several times in his life.6
We consider the same class of production functions F. For exposition it will be convenient to
restrict the supermodular function in F+ to functions with symmetric cross-partial such that fxy(x,y) =
fxy(y,x). For submodular functions in F− which induce negative sorting it will be convenient to restrict
attention to symmetry of the form fxy(x,y) = fxy(1 − y,1 − x).
We assume that the transfer in the ﬁrst period is determined by Nash bargaining with equal bar-
gaining weights. We illustrate this with our example production function f+ in (2). When a worker
x meets a ﬁrm y, the payoﬀ from matching is f(x,y). Waiting until next period and matching in the
perfectly competitive labor market yields payoﬀ w(x,µ(x)) − c to the worker and π(µ−1(y),y) − c to
the ﬁrm. A ﬁrst-period match will therefore be accepted provided that the current match surplus over
waiting is positive7 , i.e.
f(x,y) − (w∗(x) + π∗(y) − 2c) ≥ 0. (11)
For a given ﬁrm y we call the set of worker types that fulﬁll (11) his acceptance set and denote it by
a(y).8 Similar to the work by Atakan (2006) we can show that the bounds of this set are increasing if
the production function is in F+ and decreasing if it is in F−, which naturally extends the notion of
sorting to sets.







y2θ ≥ −2c. (12)










6One can think of termination of all jobs after a speciﬁed time period, with a new period of matching that follows.
More generally one may think of this as standing in for exogeneous separations into a steady state matching model.
7It may well be that for low types the surplus in the next period does not exceed the total waiting cost of 2c. In order
to avoid keeping track of endogenous entry, we assume that people will search even if that is the case. This may be due to
the fact that the outside option (e.g. unemployment beneﬁts) are contingent on searching. This issue never arises when
f(0,0) > c and w0 > c, as all agents than have an incentive to search, or when search costs are proportional as in Section
5.
8Note that for supermodular functions in F
+ this acceptance set is identical for workers and ﬁrms of the same type
types, which is a general consequence of the symmetry of fxy. Therefore the distribution of types in the second stage
is identical for workers and ﬁrms, and therefore the equilibrium assignment is still µ(x) = x. Similarly, for submodular
functions in F
− is can be shown that under our symmetry condition when x accepts y then 1 − x accepts 1 − y, which
leads to distributions that are symmetric around 1/2 (1 − Γ(x) = Γ(1 − x),1 − Υ(y) = Υ(1 − y)) and the equilibrium








Figure 2: Acceptance sets with type-independent search costs for θ = 1.
The matching sets are illustrated in Figure 2 for the case θ = 1.
Because the surplus is divided equally, the worker obtains half of this surplus on top of his outside





f(x,y) − w(x,µ(x)) − π(µ−1(y),y) + 2c






f(x,y) + w(x,µ(x)) − π(µ−1(y),y)

. (15)
It is straightforward to see that this wage is exactly in the middle of the acceptance set W(x,y)
outlined in (7) and (8) for oﬀ-equilibrium-wages of the frictionless model. This makes this model
very attractive to work with. It translates the insights from Becker’s (1973) assignment model to a
model of mismatch. It immediately implies that positive and negative sorting cannot be identiﬁed by
observed wage data, because the wages under supermodular production functions coincide with those
under submodular production functions (under misinterpretation of the unobserved ﬁrm type). Since
the wage distributions coincide, the identiﬁcation cannot come from the acceptance decisions (i.e. the
speed of matching) between ﬁrst and second period, either, because identical wages imply identical
acceptance decisions (again under the misinterpretation of ﬁrm types).9
9Bargaining weights diﬀerent from 1/2 or diﬀerent costs for workers and ﬁrms will change the bargaining sets and the
wages, but it can be shown that they will not aﬀect our results on identiﬁcation as long as search costs are identical for
all workers and for all ﬁrms.
12Figure 3: First period wages for under mismatch with a type y = x + k that is k away from the bliss
point. [Graph for x = .5, c = .25, α = θ = 1, h(x) = 0.]
Proposition 3 For every supermodular production function f+ ∈ F+ that induces positive sorting
there is a submodular production function f− ∈ F− that induces exactly the same wages for workers
when we reinterpret ﬁrm types as ˆ y = 1 − y.
Proof. Wages in the second period coincide by Proposition 1. Wages in the ﬁrst period coincide because
they are in the exact arithmetric middle of the wage set W(.,.) which by Proposition (2) coincide under
the re-interpretation.











For some of the results it will be instructive to rewrite the wages as a function of the distance k between
the worker and the ﬁrm, which for the special case of θ = 1 becomes particularly tractable:







This shows that a worker has a bliss point when matching with a ﬁrm with identical type, and
looses quadratically with the distance to the ﬁrm. The reason is that a worker who matches with a
13ﬁrm that has too low a type does not produce a lot of output. On the other hand, a worker who wants
to induce a much better ﬁrm to match with him has to compensate the ﬁrm for not matching with
a more appropriate worker. Therefore it is not necessarily better for a given worker to match with a
higher type ﬁrm. In a large region – i.e., whenever the ﬁrm is better than the worker – wages fall by
matching with even better ﬁrms. Figure 3 illustrates the wage schedule of a worker as a function of the
distance to the ﬁrm he matches with, and highlights the fact that the wage falls in ﬁrm type in part of
the region. This result holds more generally
Proposition 4 (Bliss Point). For each x ∈ (0,1) wages w(x,y) are non-monotone in y.
Proof. Wages w(x,y) are in the exact arithmetric middle of the wage set W(x,y). Since worker type
x chooses the optimal wage, by (8) any wage in W(x,y0) is lower than the wage w(x,µ(x)) under the
optimal assignment. Since W(x,µ(x)) = w(x,µ(x)) these wages arise in the ﬁrst stage. Because seach
costs are positive, all ﬁrm types close to µ(x) have a positive surplus and thus will form a match with
x in the ﬁrst stage. Therefore, wages are non-monotone around the optimum wage w(x,µ(x)).
Note that none of the results depend on an equal split of the surplus or identical search costs for
workers and ﬁrms. While this speciﬁcation makes the exposition especially tractable because we can
immediately rely on the results of the previous section, a bargaining power γ ∈ (0,1) for the workers
and a search cost cw for workers and cf for ﬁrms would only linearly rescale the wages without aﬀecting
the results further.10
In the following we show that this non-monotonicit of the wage schedule limits a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator
to detect the direction and the magnitude of sorting.
3.2 Inconclusive Firm-Fixed-Eﬀects
In this section we assess the ability of ﬁxed eﬀects approach that we discussed in the introduction to
detect the degree of sorting. We only consider the degree of sorting because we know from the previous
analysis that the direction of sorting (good workers with good ﬁrms or good workers with bad ﬁrms,
depending on the sign of the cross-partial) cannot be distinguished. We show that the decreasing part
of the wage schedule translates into ambiguous ﬁxed eﬀects.
We will illustrate our point with our example production functions (2) and (3). While for some of
our analysis it has been useful to focus on a uniform type distribution where the workers type is his
rank, here it will be more convenient to derive our results for the case of θ = 1. Any other θ (even
a type-dependent exponent θ(x) as long as θ0(x) > 0) can be obtained by allowing a ﬂexible form of
10The wage equation in (15) would simply change to w(x,y) = γ





14the distribution Γ(.) for worker and ﬁrm types.11 We can therefore restrict attention to the production
function
f(x,y) = αxy + h(x) + g(y), (16)
where the sign of alpha can be either positive or negative.12 Assume it is positive, so that the exercise
is to detect the strength of sorting and not the sign. It is easy to see from (13) that the acceptance set
a(y) = [y − K,y + K] where K = 2
p
c/α.
Fixed eﬀect estimation relies on the panel dimension of modern data sets. We assume that the
2-stage hiring process process outlined above repeats T times for each agent.13 We allow the observer
to distinguish between ﬁrst and second-period wages of the search process of each agent. Since second
stage wages are perfectly aligned, it is not possible to back out worker and ﬁrm eﬀects independently.
The ﬁrst stage does have mismatch and we look at the ability of the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect here. This eﬀect is
the wage that a ﬁrm pays its worker net of the average wage that worker’s obtain. We assume that the
panel is long enough such that we can abstract from the stochastic nature of the average wage. That




[w(x,y) − wav(x)]dΓ(x|y). (17)
The term Γ(x|y) = Γ(x)/[Γ(y+K)−Γ(y−K)] reﬂects the distribution of the worker types conditional
on being willing to match with type y and in the following γ(x|y) will denote its density. The restriction
to y ∈ [2K,1 − 2K] ensures exactly that there is no boundary problem to consider here, nor in the












k2υ(x + k|x)dk (18)
This term is particularly easy under the uniform distribution, where wav(x) = h(x)+αx2/2−αK2/12.
We are interested if this ﬁxed eﬀect is increasing in the type of the ﬁrm. That is, we are interested
whether higher productivity ﬁrms on average pay higher wages once we control for the average wage
11When x is uniformly distributed, then Γ(x) = x. For any strictly increasing tranformation v(x) [such as v(x) = x
θ(x)
with θ
0(x) > 0] and production function f(v(x),v(y)) we can without loss of generality specify f(x,y) but change the
distributions to ˆ Γ(·) = Γ(v
−1(·)) and ˆ Υ(·) = Υ(v
−1(·)). For this exercise we retain symmetric type distributions.
12To caputre (3) the term αx(1 − y) can be split in −αxy and αx, where we can attribute the latter to h(x).
13Since the worker’s static problem is identical under negative or positive sorting, the panel dimension does not add to
the identiﬁcation of the sign of the cross-partial. It does allow for identiﬁcation of the absolute value of the cross-partial,
which is a measure for the loss from mismatch.
14We exclude the types close to the edges of the type space as their matching set is constrained. Analyzing this case is
not diﬃcult, but burdensome in notation as the matching set is a(y) = [max{0,y − K},min{1,y + K}]. Neglecting this
part neglects only a small part of the type space when c and thus K is small.
15that the workers in this ﬁrm are getting. Controlling for the workers’ average wage is a feature of the
ﬁxed eﬀects approach outlined in (1). Without controlling for workers average wage it is trivially true
that under supermodularity higher productivity ﬁrms pay higher wages (while under submodularity







+(w(y + K,y) − wav(y + K))γ(y + K|y)
−(w(y − K,y) − wav(y − K))γ(y − K|y).
Call the term in the ﬁrst line Ψ0
1(y) and the terms in the second and third line Ψ0
2(y) so that Ψ0(y) =
Ψ0
1(y)+Ψ0
2(y). The ﬁrst eﬀect Ψ0
1(y) accounts for the wage change across those workers with which this
ﬁrm type matches. The second eﬀect Ψ0
2(y) reﬂects that the set of workers that match with a ﬁrm is
slightly changing when the ﬁrm type changes.










That is, the low ability workers x < y loose when the ﬁrm gets better, while the workers with relatively
high ability x > y gains when the ﬁrm gets better. This happens because in the ﬁrst case the distance
between the worker and the ﬁrm grows and the match becomes less eﬃcient, while in the latter case
the distance shrink closer to the optimal assignment. How does this eﬀect turn out?
For a uniform distribution the positive eﬀect that a slightly better ﬁrm type has on the high worker
types that it is willing to employ exactly oﬀsets the negative eﬀect on the lower worker types that it
employs.15 It is easy to see that distributions that lead to more weight on high worker types lend more
weight to the positive aspect, while a distribution that lends more weight to negative worker types leads
to a negative eﬀect:
Ψ0
1(y) > 0 if γ0(x|y) > 0 for all y
Ψ0
1(y) = 0 if γ0(x|y) = 0 for all y
Ψ0
1(y) < 0 if γ0(x|y) < 0 for all y.
(20)
This illustrates that the eﬀect that higher ﬁrm types have on those workers they have in common with
lower ﬁrm types. It is ambiguous, and could go up or down depending on whether the economy exhibits
relatively more high type workers or vice versa.




























16For completeness we consider also the second eﬀect that comes through the changing matching set.
This eﬀect is complicated in general, but becomes tractable when we consider the case where the ﬁrm’s
type density is linear. Tor constant υ0(y|x) we obtain in the appendix that16
Ψ0
2(y) < 0 if γ0(x|y) > 0 for all y
Ψ0
2(y) = 0 if γ0(x|y) = 0 for all y
Ψ0
2(y) > 0 if γ0(x|y) < 0 for all y.
(21)
For this case the eﬀects Ψ0
1(y) and Ψ0
2(y) run therefore in opposite directions, again reducing the overall
eﬀect even when the distribution is not uniform. It is not diﬃcult to construct type distributions for
which the overall eﬀect is always negative or always positive for all types y ∈ [2K,1 − 2K].
One main conclusion is that the ranking of ﬁrms even when we know that we have assortative
matching cannot be backed out from the ﬁrm-ﬁxed-eﬀects when the distribution is uniform (at least
for interior types y ∈ [2K,1 − 2K]). The reason is not that workers are actually sorting randomly.
The matching sets can be arbitrarily small so that workers focus on a very narrow band of ﬁrms with
whom they are willing to match. The reason is that the increased wages for some workers are oﬀset by
decreased wages on other (worse) workers.
4 Identifying the Strength of Sorting
We have shown that it is not possible to distinguish negative from positive sorting when only wage
and acceptance data is available (Proposition 3). Moreover, in our environment current ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation not only fails at the direction but also at estimating the strength of sorting. This raises the
question whether anything about the strength of sorting can be identiﬁed from the data. In economic
terms this might be more interesting than the direction of sorting (positive or negative) since the welfare
depends on matching the right types, not on who these types are. Identifying some information about
the strength of sorting reveals whether welfare depends to a large degree or a small degree on the right
assignment of workers to ﬁrms.
In this section we argue that the strength of the sorting will be identiﬁable if a worker goes through
this hiring process several times - i.e. if a panel dimension is available. It is possible to determine
how much is gained in terms of welfare from matching agents perfectly. The cross-partial can only
be determined within the bounds of the matching sets, though. For ﬁrm-worker-pairs that will not
match this cross-partial cannot be determined. Under parametric forms as in our leading example the
16For symmetric distributions Γ(·) = Υ(·) this means that υ
0(y|x) = γ
0(x|y) = r and therefore Ψ
0
2(y) < 0 if r > 0,
Ψ
0
2(y) = 0 if r = 0 and Ψ
0
2(y) > 0 if r < 0.
17cross-partial can be extended to all matches, which makes it possible to evaluate the overall eﬃciency
loss between perfect sorting and completely random matching.
Since we cannot identify the productivity of a ﬁrm, for this section we will rank ﬁrms diﬀerently.
If the production function is indeed supermodular, we will learn about the cross-partial of f(x,y). If
the cross-partial is negative, we will learn about the cross-partial of misspeciﬁed production function
˜ f(x,y) = f(x,1 − y) because we will misinterpret bad ﬁrms as good ﬁrms. Since ˜ fxy = |fxy| we will
nevertheless learn about the gain from better sorting.
For the empirical implementation two ingredients will be important. First, we rely on the panel
dimension of available data sets. Again we think that the hiring process outlined above repeats T times,









ﬁrm j. Identical numbers of draws are not important, it just simpliﬁes the exposition. Second, we restrict
attention to workers in a particular occupation and assume that within this occupation a ﬁrm of type
y produces f(x,y) with each worker that it hires. That is, a ﬁrm y that has three jobs in a speciﬁc
profession such as technicians and hires them at skills x1, x2 and x3 obtains output
P3
i=1 f(xi,y). This
allows us to interpret a multi-worker ﬁrm as a ﬁrm with a single vacancy that interacts with a sequence
of diﬀerent workers.17 The identiﬁcation works along three steps.
First, we will exploit the maximum wage of workers and ﬁrms to identify their type. For an agent





If the panel dimension is long enough this wage is arbitrarily close to the optimal wage. That is, if k
is a worker than this wage is close to his theoretical optimum w(k,µ(k)). For the current exposition
we neglect the ﬁnite sample diﬀerence and assume that maximum wage in the panel exactly coincides
with the theoretical optimum. We can observe the distribution of these wages across workers. This
yields the cumulative distribution ΩW(w) over the maximum wages across workers. Since good workers
achieve high wages, a worker’s rank can be recovered by the relationship
xk = ΩW(wk).
¿From now on we can refer to workers by their type x and call his maximum wage wx. Alternatively we
could have used the average wage of a worker, and determine his type by the rank in the distribution
of average wages relative to all workers. This might be a more robust approach to the worker’s type
when the panel is ﬁnite.
17We mention the focus on a particular occuption only because it seems hard to argue that the production function has
such a simple separable form accross occupations, while within an occupation this might be less objectionable.
18Similarly, we can consider ﬁrms. Let ΩF(w) be the cumulative distribution across ﬁrms over the
maximum wages paid by those ﬁrms. We attribute the following rank to a ﬁrm
yk = ΩF(wk).
We can now directly refer to ﬁrms by their rank y. This type correctly identiﬁes the ﬁrms rank when
we order ﬁrms by their eagerness of having a good workers (i.e. by their improvement in output from
increasing the workers type). Again, a more robust ranking might be the ranking of ﬁrms by their
average wages. It is important that these are ”raw” wages that are not adjusted for the type of worker.
The reason we do not condition is because we want to identify the ﬁrms that are more eager to have
higher workers (rank y under PAM, rank 1 − y under NAM) without a concern of identifying whether
the ﬁrm is truly more productive.
We can identify for each worker x the lowest ﬁrm y that it matches with. We call that ﬁrm y(x).
If the panel dimension in the data is long enough, y(x) is arbitrarily close to the lower bound of the
workers acceptance range.
Second, we will exploit the spread between the maximum wage and the minimum wage that workers





of the worker with type x coincides with the theoretical minimum that the worker is willing to accept
in the ﬁrst period of the search process. The costs of waiting are given by the diﬀerence between the
maximum and the minimum wage of a worker18
c = wx − wx,
or we can determine it in aggregate by the average range of wages across workers.
Third, we use the relation between the matching set and the cost of waiting to learn about the
strength of the cross-partial. The loss L(x,y) due to mismatch is the value that is created by pair (x,y)
minus their marginal contribution under perfect sorting
L(x,y) = f(x,y) −
Z x
0
fx(˜ x, ˜ x)d˜ x −
Z y
0
fy(˜ y, ˜ y)d˜ y − f(0,0). (22)






fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ xd˜ y (23)
18We have assumed identical costs for all workers. The theory can be extended to type-dependent costs c(x). See the
Discussion Section.
19This is gives the loss when matching is indeed positive assortative. If matching is negative assortative,
we misidentiﬁed a worker type as y = 1−ˆ y when ˆ y is the true type. Nevertheless the loss can be written
exactly as in (23) for the misidentiﬁed production function ˜ f(x,y) = f(x, ˆ y), and so the cross-partial
˜ fxy(x,y) = −fxy(x,1 − y) can be identify correctly except for the sign.
Workers and ﬁrms internalize this in their matching decision. If the lowest trading partner of worker
x is in the interior, i.e. y(x) > 0, then this partner’s type is determined by the indiﬀerence condition






fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ xd˜ y = −2c. (24)
This is a functional equation that identiﬁes fxy evaluated at (x,y(x)), for all x ∈ [0,1].
The condition identiﬁes the cross-partial because it compares the noise in the matching sets (x−y(x))
to the noise in the wage data (2c). If the wages vary substantially but matching sets are small, there
must be a large loss in matching by slightly deviating from the optimal type, i.e. the cross-partial must
be large.
Obviously this approach gives an idea about the cross-partial only for some parts of the (x,y) space.
Especially, this does not allow for the inference on the cross-partial for pairs of workers and ﬁrms that
do not match. We can extend the analysis to the entire type space if we are willing to make more
stringent parametric assumptions on the cross-partials that we assume to hold on the entire parameter





By (24) we can identify the strength of sorting via equation







as long as y(x) > 0. Parameters |α| and θ can be identiﬁed by the joint behavior of x and y(x). Simple
non-linear regression techniques can asses these parameters if one is willing to attribute the noise in the
process to measurement error. The gain measured in the dollar amount that perfect matching generates














(xθ − yθ)2dxdy = |α|
θ2
(2θ + 1)(θ + 1)2.
20Clearly one can also use the computed acceptance bounds (12) to integrate up the loss under the
current mismatch compared to the frictionless optimal assignment, or to compare the current mismatch
to complete randomness.
5 Discussion and Extensions
In this paper we pursue two goals. First, we use the most well-known model of sorting by Becker (1973)
to gain insights into the wage setting process. We extend the model in the smallest possible way to
allow for mismatch while retaining the basic idea underlying the assortative matching model. This
allows us to provide analytical expressions for the mismatched wages in the model, to characterize their
bliss point property, and to provide an explicit version of a ﬁxed eﬀects method used in the empirical
literature. We show that the latter is neither well-suited to identify the sign nor the strength of sorting.
Identiﬁcation of the direction of sorting is in general impossible because ﬁrms pay wages based on the
gain they have from employing a higher worker, not because they themselves are productive. Even
under positive sorting the ﬁxed eﬀects approach is not able to identify the strength of sorting because
wages are non-monotone in ﬁrm type. This non-monotonicity is at odds with the basic ﬁxed-eﬀects
idea, and we show that the net eﬀect may be zero.
Second, we propose to abandon the attempt to identify from wage data the sign of sorting. The
mere fact that wages are determined mainly by the need for having a better worker (which is based on
the cross-partial and not the ﬁrst derivatives) makes such identiﬁcation diﬃcult. Under submodularity
it is the low productivity ﬁrms that especially need good workers to increase their (in terms of levels)
meager proﬁts, while under submodularity it is the productive ﬁrms that need more productive workers
most. In both cases the ﬁrms that need the productive workers most have an incentive to pay high
wages, which makes identiﬁcation without proﬁt (per job) data diﬃcult. Yet in economic terms the
sign of sorting may be less important than the gain that is achieved by sorting workers into the “right”
job. We show that some information about this gain can be identiﬁed from wage data. We propose
a speciﬁc method of backing out this strength locally around the equilibrium path. The identiﬁcation
comes from determining some notion of the size of the set of ﬁrms with which a worker matches. If a
worker is only willing to match with a small fraction of ﬁrms, for a given level of frictions (which we
can identify from the data) the complementarities must be large. Similarly, when a worker is willing to
match with many ﬁrm types the complementarities must be weak. This gives a well-deﬁned notion of
the dollar-value of the gain from sorting in the market.
Our method may well not be the only one that identiﬁes the strength of sorting. Since existing
attempts have mainly considered the sign of sorting, this area is not well-developed. We believe that
21other methods that compare the noise in the accepted matches of a worker (i.e. the range of the type
space or the range of wages) with the total noise in the market as a whole are promising in shedding light
on this issue. Similarly, one can look at the problem from the ﬁrm side. When within-ﬁrm variation
of worker types (or their salaries – depending on the model) is low relative to the overall variation in
the data, for given level of frictions complementarities must be large for agents to focus on a narrow
band of matches. For example, Lopes de Melo (2008) considers the within-ﬁrm correlation of wages
as a measure. Comparisons with the variation overall might capture something about the strength
of sorting. Evaluating the strength of sorting this way is important in order to assess the welfare-
consequences of matching agents better. The main diﬃculty is to distinguish the cause of the relative
noise levels. It could be that frictions are high and therefore workers accept nearly all matches, or
complementarities are low. The challenge is to propose procedures that separate the source of frictions
from the complementarity, and the procedure in the previous section presents one approach to do this.
We now brieﬂy discuss some of the other issues that may be of importance in identifying sorting.
On-the-job-search. On-the-Job-Search (OJS) is a likely candidate for identifying sorting using equi-
librium mismatch (see also Bagger and Lentz (2008) and Lopes de Melo (2008)). As long as a job is
scarce, matched pairs face a trade-oﬀ between matching early and waiting.19 Like in our models with
friction, this induces a trade-oﬀ between accepting some degree of mismatch and waiting. With OJS,
this happens simultaneously.
Using Data on Proﬁts: the Attribution Problem. One obvious observation is that with data on
proﬁts we can identify both the strength and the sign of sorting. And while there are good data on
ﬁrm proﬁts, there are no data on job proﬁts. In multi-worker ﬁrms, we need to attribute the share of
each worker’s contribution to the overall ﬁrm proﬁts. Even in the simplest economy we need to decide
what the contribution of very diﬀerent individuals (CEO, secretary and janitor) is to the ﬁrm proﬁt.
Since this decomposition seems diﬃcult across occupations, we propose to focus on the economically
important and manageable problem of the identifying the strength of sorting.
Being aware of the shortcomings of the wage data in ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, Mendes, van den Berg,
and Lindeboom (2007) use productivity data instead. They choose average ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity to
attribute output from the ﬁrm to an individual worker. They ﬁnd that average ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity
and worker skill exhibit strong positive sorting.
More General Technologies. Above, we have shown that the strength of the sorting can be identiﬁed,
but not the sign. This suggests that our analysis extends to an even broader class of preferences.
19In Bagger and Lentz (2008) jobs are not scarce since ﬁrms can open as many jobs as they want. The sorting eﬀect in
their model derives from diﬀerences in the intensity by which workers search for a new job.
22Suppose output is maximized when “similar” agents match, then there is no ranking of better jobs, but
we can still identify how strong the complementarity is between workers with our approach. Observe
that this does include more realistic cases of production technologies where types are multi-dimensional.
All the information that we use to identify the sorting eﬀect is embedded in the wages, thus giving us
a monetary value (and therefore one-dimensional order) of sorting.
Type-Dependent Search Costs. We analyzed a model of matching that replicates the payoﬀs of the
model by Becker (1973). While in Becker sorting is perfect and matches lie only on the diagonal of the
type distribution, we extend his setting to allow for matches also oﬀ that diagonal, while retaining the
payoﬀs that Becker’s competitive model predicts for such matches by following the basic methodology
of Atakan (2006).
The introduction of waiting costs can be done in ways that deliver wages that do not coincide with
those predicted in Becker’s theory. For example, introducing waiting costs through time discounting
with factor β ∈ (0,1) along a methodology similar to Shimer and Smith (2000) leads to diﬀerent payoﬀs.
The reason is that waiting costs are now diﬀerent for diﬀerent types, with higher types suﬀering a higher
loss when they don’t trade immediately. This allows workers to gain from trading with higher types.
While this potentially makes identiﬁcation possible (in contrast to Section 3), the variability that is
introduced is small when discounting is large because wages are still mainly determined by the need
of hiring better workers. More severely, even under diﬀerential waiting costs in the current empirical
approach via ﬁxed eﬀects it is not guaranteed that higher productivity ﬁrms on average pay higher
wages after controlling for worker types (similar to Section 4).
We conclude by brieﬂy sketching the analysis with discounting. Under a simpliﬁed version of our
production function f+(x,y) = xy second period payoﬀs for worker type x is still x2/2 and for ﬁrm
type y it is y2/2. When discounting replaces ﬁxed waiting costs the workers wage in a match (x,y) in




























where the ﬁrst term in square brackets is the surplus from matching now rather than waiting, which
is split between the agents, while the second term is the amount that the worker can assure himself
by waiting. Workers are willing to match with ﬁrm y if the surplus in the squre bracket in (25) is


















The bargaining allows the worker to partially proﬁt from better ﬁrms, which means that under the
23submodular speciﬁcation f−(x,y) = (1 − y)x + y the wage will be as in (25) when we replace y by its
transform ˜ y = 1 − y, plus an added term 1
2(1 − β)(1 − ˜ y). This added term is small when β is close to
one relative to the other terms in the wage equation, and therefore potentially diﬃcult to detect with
statistical signiﬁcance when job ﬁnding rates are high (i.e., when the associated time diﬀerence between
ﬁrst and second period is low). Nevertheless, the term is not coincidental in the sense that identical
second period wages will require diﬀerences in ﬁrst period wages induced by bargaining, and suﬃcient
data quantities might allow it to be backed out in a structural estimation.20
The current ﬁxed eﬀect estimators are still not well suited to detect this eﬀect. While now workers
beneﬁt in the bargaining stage from higher types, this eﬀect is linear, while the opportunity cost
of occupying the “wrong” job is increasing more than linearly whenever the production function is
supermodular. This is reﬂected by the quadratic negative term in the wage equation and is also reﬂected
in the lower bound of the acceptance set a(y). The reason why very low workers are not willing to match
with this ﬁrm is that their wage would be too bad because they would have to compensate the ﬁrm for
forgoing very proﬁtable production opportunities in the future.
That the wage in (25) is hump-shaped can be seen by considering the derivative of the wage with









which is negative when x < βy. Therefore, the wage is decreasing for all worker types in [Ky,βy], i.e.
that have decreasing derivative and are within the acceptance set a(y). This set is non-empty for any
discount factor.21 Figure 4 illustrates the wage pattern as the function of the distance k between the
worker and the ﬁrm. The wages at the boundaries reﬂect the value from waiting and therefore have
to have same level. In the middle the distribution is single-peaked, only that the peak is shifted to
higher wages compared to the previous section. Still roughly for half of the acceptance set the wage is
decreasing in the productivity of the ﬁrm and falls to the value of waiting at the boundary. Again this
induces ambiguous ﬁxed eﬀects for ﬁrms, depending if there are relatively many or relatively few bad
workers in the economy. Looking again at the ﬁxed eﬀect for ﬁrm y yields an expression identical to




and the conditional distribution adjusted
20Bagger and Lentz (2008) have a search intensity margin, which also allows them to recover identiﬁcation of the sign
of sorting.







y < βy if and only if 1 − β
2 > (1 − β
2)
2, which is true for
all β ∈ (0,1).
24Figure 4: First period wages for under mismatch with a type that is k away from the bliss point. [Graph
for x = .5,β = .98]






























While this ﬁxed eﬀect is harder to analyze than expression (19) for type-independent search costs, it is
still easy to see that this expression is not in general positive. The ﬁrst line is negative if γ is suﬃciently
decreasing, because then γ(x|y) is suﬃciently decreasing and the type space gives more weight to low
worker types. On average the workers suﬀer from an improvement in the ﬁrm quality because the ﬁrm
moves further from the bliss point of the low worker types which are more predominant. Also, the third
line is larger than the second when γ(x|y) is suﬃciently decreasing. Both eﬀects together clearly induce
an eﬀect in which better ﬁrms have lower ﬁxed eﬀects because most workers in the economy have a type
lower then them. Again we believe that an approach based on the bounds of the acceptance set relative
to the entire type space similar to Section 4 will be useful in considering the strength of sorting..
22The second line in the following expression only arises for Ky < 1, otherwise the upper bound is 1 and is not aﬀected
by a change in y.
256 Concluding Remarks
We argue that identifying the sign of sorting from wage data alone is diﬃcult, if not impossible. The
main reason is that the wages reﬂect at least in part the marginal contribution to the value that the
ﬁrm generates, and it can be either the more productive or the less productive ﬁrms that have a higher
marginal beneﬁt from employing a better worker. The empirical question whether or not there is
evidence of sorting remains to be answered. In many settings we expect more able workers to have a
higher marginal contribution to more productive ﬁrms, but in some industries more productive ﬁrms
have invested in automatization that allows workers with lower skills to perform the high productivity
jobs (e.g. retail trade). We argue that it is possible to identify the strength of sorting, though the
commonly used ﬁxed eﬀect methods are not suitable for the task. With estimates of the strength of
sorting in hand, the objective is to be able to assess the eﬃciency implications.
267 Appendix
Derivation of (21): Observe that both w(y + K,y) and w(y − K,y) are wages for workers that are
exactly indiﬀerent between matching now and not matching. This indiﬀerence implies w(y + K,y) =
h(y+K)+
α(y+K)2
2 −c and w(y−K,y) = h(y−K)+
α(y−K)2
2 −c. Since the average wage than a worker
gets when matching in the ﬁrst stage is better than not matching, the diﬀerence between these wages










k2υ(y + K + k|y + K)dk









k2υ(y − K + k|y − K)dk

γ(y − K|y).
This eﬀect depends on y only through the eﬀect on the distribution. Therefore, again this eﬀect is zero
under a uniform distribution. For other distributions the eﬀect is ambiguous because it relies on the
density at the endpoints as well as on the integral over the density. In the special case where υ0(y|x) = r
is constant the density is linear, and so are the conditional densities. In such a case symmetry around
zero of k2 ensures that −1
4
R K
−K k2υ(Y + k|Y )dk is independent of Y and the terms in square brackets
are identical, which directly leads to the inequalities in (21).




fy(x, ˜ y)d˜ y + f(x,0) −
Z x
0
fx(˜ x, ˜ x)d˜ x −
Z y
0






fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ xd˜ y +
Z y
0






fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ yd˜ x −
Z x
0





fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ xd˜ y −
Z y
0











fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ yd˜ x
















0 fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ yd˜ x integrates for each ˜ x over all ˜ y ≤ ˜ x. Similarly, one can for each ˜ y integrate


























fxy(˜ x, ˜ y)d˜ xd˜ y.
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